Provision of public goods is a key task for governments. Politicians are entrusted with optimally investing state revenue. In cases in which incentives between the politician and the public are not aligned, this process is prone to be exploited for personal enrichment. Media plays a critical role in holding politicians accountable by informing the public about the actions of their political leaders. When politicians gain media capture, this function is undermined. Politicians may manipulate coverage to create a positive perception of themselves. If they are successful, politicians can obtain private benefits while relying on high cooperation from the public.

This paper experimentally investigates whether government’s strategic media manipulation can foster cooperation by the public. In a public good game with asymmetric agents, four players – the citizens – can contribute to a public good, while one player – the dictator – can either add to or embezzle from the public good. I compare behaviour in environments with different degrees of uncertainty to behaviour when dictators can manipulate information. Therefore, I can distinguish the effects of strategic communication on contribution levels from general uncertainty effects and informational credibility. This allows me to identify a causal link between strategic information manipulation and cooperation setting my experimental approach apart from empirical contributions in this field.